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This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-
lookingagentswherepayoffsaregivenbyasupermodularnormalformgame. The
stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage
game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone potential maximizer,
then the corresponding stationary state is uniquely linearly absorbing and glob-
ally accessible for any small degree of friction. A simple example of a unanimity
game with three players is provided where there are multiple globally accessible
states for a small friction.
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1. Introduction
Supermodular games capture the key concept of strategic complementarity in various
economic phenomena. Examples include oligopolistic competition, the adoption of
new technologies, bank runs, currency crises, and economic development. Strategic
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(Cooper1999). Fromatheoreticalviewpoint,supermodulargameshaveappealingprop-
erties due to their monotone structure (Topkis 1979, Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Vives
1990, and Athey 2001).
A salient feature of supermodular games is that they typically admit multiple strict
Nash equilibria due to the presence of strategic complementarities, which raises the
question as to which equilibrium is likely to be played. To address the problem of equi-
librium selection, game theory has so far proposed two major lines of approach be-
sides the classic one of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). One is to consider the stability
of Nash equilibria in transition dynamics (Kandori et al. 1993, Young 1993; KMRY for
short). The other is to embed the original game in a static incomplete information
game and examine the robustness of equilibrium outcomes to a small amount of un-
certainty (Carlsson and van Damme 1993, Kajii and Morris 1997). Early papers using
these two approaches studied 22 coordination games and established a connection
between the approaches through risk-dominance due to Harsanyi and Selten (1988):
the risk-dominant equilibrium is played most of the time in the long run in stochastic
evolutionary dynamics as shown by KMRY, and it is the unique rationalizable outcome
in slightly perturbed incomplete information games, called global games, as shown by
Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Beyond 22 games, however, the connection fails.
The incomplete information approach, on the one hand, has provided general results
for larger classes of games, by using the concepts of p-dominance and the (generalized)
potential function (Frankel et al. 2003, Kajii and Morris 1997, and Morris and Ui 20051).
For the stochastic evolutionary dynamic approach à la KMRY, on the other hand, the
results obtained so far apply only to restricted classes of games.2 Kim (1996) shows that
these approaches predict different outcomes in some binary action games with more
than two players.
In the present paper, we study an alternative to KMRY, the perfect foresight dy-
namics ﬁrst introduced by Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) for 2  2 games.3 Matsui
and Matsuyama (1995) formalize a dynamic adjustment process in a large society
where agents make irreversible decisions (e.g., career or sector choices as considered in
Matsuyama 1991) and examine the possibility that forward-looking expectations desta-
bilize strict Nash equilibria. They demonstrate that in 22 coordination games, if the
degree of friction in action revisions is sufﬁciently small, then the belief that all agents
will switch from the risk-dominated action to the risk-dominant one can become self-
fulﬁlling, whereas the belief in the reverse switch cannot. Our ﬁrst purpose in this paper
is to develop a general theory of stability under perfect foresight dynamics for super-
modular games. The second is to derive sufﬁcient conditions for the stability of Nash
equilibria for broader classes of supermodular games than 2  2 games, thereby ex-
tending the connection between the dynamic stability approach and the incomplete
information approach. Speciﬁcally, we show that for games with monotone potentials,
1See also Morris and Shin (2003) for an extensive survey.
2See, among others, Kandori and Rob (1995), Young (1998), and Durieu et al. (2006).
3This class of dynamics is studied also by Matsuyama (1991) but with nonlinear payoff functions in the
context of development economics. See also Matsuyama (1992) and Kaneda (1995).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 157
our condition coincides with the condition for robustness to incomplete information
(Morris and Ui 2005).
We employ the following framework. The society consists of N large populations
of inﬁnitesimal agents, who are repeatedly and randomly matched to play an N-player
normal form game. There are frictions: each agent must make a commitment to a par-
ticular action for a random time interval. Opportunities to revise actions follow Poisson
processes that are independent across agents. The dynamic process thus exhibits iner-
tia in that the action distribution in the society changes continuously. Unlike in stan-
dard evolutionary games, each agent forms his belief about the future path of the action
distribution and, when given a revision opportunity, takes an action to maximize his
expected discounted payoff. A perfect foresight path is deﬁned to be a feasible path of
action distributions along which every revising agent takes a best response to the future
course of play. While the stationary states of these dynamics correspond to the Nash
equilibria of the stage game, there may also exist a perfect foresight path that escapes
from a strict Nash equilibrium when the degree of friction, deﬁned as the discounted
average duration of the commitment, is sufﬁciently small. We say that a Nash equilib-
rium a is linearly absorbing if the feasible path converging linearly to a is the unique
perfect foresight path whenever the initial state is close enough to a; a is globally ac-
cessible if for any initial state, there exists a perfect foresight path converging to a.4 If a
Nash equilibrium is both linearly absorbing and globally accessible, then self-fulﬁlling
expectations cannot destabilize this equilibrium, whereas from any other equilibrium,
expectationsmaylead thesocietytothis equilibrium; thatistosay, itis theuniqueequi-
librium that is robust to the possibility of self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
In this paper, we consider supermodular games and games that have a monotonic
relationship with supermodular games, by employing methods of analysis based on
monotonicity and comparison. An underlying observation is that a perfect foresight
path is characterized as a ﬁxed point of the best response correspondence deﬁned on
the set of feasible paths. We observe that if the stage game is supermodular, this cor-
respondence is monotone with respect to the partial order over feasible paths induced
by the stochastic dominance order. We then compare the perfect foresight paths of two
different stage games that are comparable in terms of best responses and show the fol-
lowing analogue of the comparison theorem from the theory of monotone dynamical
systems (Smith 1995):5 if at least one of the two games is supermodular, then the order
4Since there may exist multiple perfect foresight paths from a given initial state, it is possible that a state
is globally accessible but not linearly absorbing. Indeed, we provide an example where there exist multiple
globally accessible states when the friction is small; by deﬁnition, none of them is linearly absorbing.
5In the case of Euclidean space, the comparison theorem says that if two dynamical systems are ordered
with respect to the partial order of the Euclidean space and at least one of them is a cooperative monotone
system, then, when their initial conditions are ordered, any two solutions that these systems generate are
ordered as well.
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002, 2007) show that when the underlying game is supermodular, the per-
turbed best response dynamics form a monotone dynamical system. The perfect foresight dynamics, on
the other hand, cannot be considered as a dynamical system due to the multiplicity of perfect foresight
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ofbestresponsesbetweenthegamesispreservedintheperfectforesightdynamics. This
fact allows us to transfer stability properties from one game to the other.
We apply our monotone methods to the class of games with monotone potentials
introduced by Morris and Ui (2005), who show that a monotone potential maximizer
(MP-maximizer) is robust to incomplete information (Kajii and Morris 1997).6 A normal
form game is said to have a monotone potential if it is comparable (in terms of best re-
sponses) to a potential game, and the action proﬁle that maximizes the potential is said
to be an MP-maximizer. Monotone potential games include both potential games and,
interestingly, games with a p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i pi <1. By invoking the po-
tential game results due to Hofbauer and Sorger (2002), our main result shows that if
the stage game or the monotone potential is supermodular, then an MP-maximizer is
globally accessible for any small degree of friction and (generically) linearly absorbing
for any degree of friction. Our result uniﬁes and extends previous results using poten-
tial maximization (Hofbauer and Sorger 1999, 2002) and p-dominance (Oyama 2002), as
donebyMorrisandUi(2005)fortherobustnessofequilibriatoincompleteinformation.
The concept of a perfect foresight path requires that agents optimize against their
beliefs about the future path of the action distribution and that these beliefs coincide
with the actual path. Relaxing the latter requirement, Matsui and Oyama (2006) intro-
duce a model of rationalizable foresight dynamics, where while the rationality of the
agents as well as the structure of the society is common knowledge, beliefs about the fu-
ture path are not necessarily coordinated among the agents. It is instead assumed that
the agents form their beliefs in a rationalizable manner: in particular, they may mis-
forecast the future. A rationalizable foresight path is a feasible path along which every
revising agent optimizes against another rationalizable foresight path. We show that in
supermodular games, a linearly absorbing and globally accessible state is the unique
state from which no rationalizable foresight path escapes. That is, our stability results
for supermodular games hold also under the less demanding assumption of rationaliz-
able foresight.
We brieﬂy review existing results in the literature on perfect foresight dynamics.
Oyama (2002) appeals to the notion of p-dominance to identify (in a single population
setting)aclassofgameswhereonecanexplicitlycharacterizethesetofperfectforesight
paths relevant for stability considerations, showing that a p-dominant equilibrium with
p < 1=2 is selected.7 Hofbauer and Sorger (2002), Kojima (2006), and Kojima and Taka-
hashi (forthcoming) obtain related results based on other generalizations of the risk-
dominanceconceptinamultiplepopulationsetting.8 HofbauerandSorger(1999,2002)
establish the selection of the unique potential maximizer in potential games, both in a
single population setting and in a multi-population setting.9 Their results rely on the
6Morris and Ui (2005) show more generally that a generalized potential maximizer is robust to incom-
plete information. A monotone potential induces a generalized potential in the case considered here.
Frankel et al. (2003) show that under certain conditions, a local potential maximizer (LP-maximizer) is
selectedin globalgameswith strategiccomplementarities. Ingames withmarginaldiminishing returns, an
LP-maximizer is an MP-maximizer.
7Tercieux (2006) considers set-valued stability concepts and obtains a similar result.
8Kim (1996) establishes a similar result for binary games with many identical players.
9To be precise, they show that a unique potential maximizer a is absorbing (and globally accessible forTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 159
relationship between the perfect foresight paths and the solutions to, roughly, an asso-
ciated “dynamic potential maximization” problem as well as the Hamiltonian structure
of the dynamics when the stage game is a potential game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces perfect foresight dynam-
ics for general ﬁnite N-player games and provides a characterization of perfect fore-
sight paths as the ﬁxed points of the best response correspondence deﬁned on the set
of feasible paths. Section 3 studies monotone properties of perfect foresight dynam-
ics and proves our comparison theorem. It also examines the relationship between the
stability concepts under perfect foresight and those under rationalizable foresight. Sec-
tion 4 considers games with monotone potentials and establishes the selection of an
MP-maximizer. Section 5 concludes.
2. Perfect foresight dynamics
2.1 Stage game
Let G = (I,(Ai)i2I,(ui)i2I) be a normal form game with N  2 players, where I =
f1,2,...,Ng is the set of players, Ai = f0,1,...,nig is the ﬁnite set of actions of player
i 2 I, and ui :
Q
i2I Ai ! R is the payoff function of player i. We denote
Q
i2I Ai by A
and
Q
j6=i Aj by A i.
Denote by R+ the set of all nonnegative real numbers and by R++ the set of all posi-














in Ai with the element of (Ai) that assigns one to the corresponding coordinate. The
polyhedron
Q
i2I (Ai) is a subset of the n-dimensional real space endowed with the
sup norm jj, where n =
P
i2I(ni +1). For x 2
Q
i (Ai) and " > 0, B"(x) denotes the
"-neighborhood of x relative to
Q
i (Ai), i.e., B"(x)=fy 2
Q
i (Ai)jjy  xj<"g.
Payoff functions ui(h,) are extended to
Q



















j2I (Aj). Let bri(x i) be the set of best responses to x i 2
Q
j6=i (Aj) in pure
small friction): i.e., any perfect foresight path, which may or may not be unique, from a neighborhood of a
must converge to a. It is not known whether a potential maximizer is linearly absorbing. In supermodular





=fh 2Ai jui(h,x i)ui(k,x i) for all k 2Aig.
An element x 2
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Let (A i) be the set of probability distributions on A i. We sometimes extend




2.2 Perfect foresight paths
Given an N-player normal form game, which we call the stage game, we consider the
following dynamic societal game. Society consists of N large populations of inﬁnitesi-
mal agents, one for each role in the stage game. In each population, agents are identical
and anonymous. At each point in time, one agent is selected randomly from each pop-
ulation and matched to form an N-tuple and play the stage game. Agents cannot switch
actions at every point in time. Instead, every agent must make a commitment to a par-
ticular action for a random time interval. Time instants at which each agent can switch
actions follow a Poisson process with the arrival rate  > 0. The processes are indepen-
dent across agents. We choose without loss of generality the unit of time in such a way
that =1.10
The action distribution in population i 2 I at time t 2R+ is denoted by
i(t)=(i0(t),i1(t),...,ini(t))2(Ai),
where ih(t) is the fraction of agents who are committed to action h 2 Ai at time t. Let
(t) = (1(t),2(t),...,N(t)) 2
Q
i (Ai). Due to the assumption that the switching
times follow independent Poisson processes with arrival rate  = 1, ih() is Lipschitz
continuous with Lipschitz constant 1, which implies in particular that it is differentiable




˙ ih(t)=0. We call such a path () a feasible path.
Definition 2.1. A path : R+ !
Q
i (Ai) is feasible if it is Lipschitz continuous and for
all i 2 I and almost all t 0 there exists i(t)2(Ai) such that
˙ i(t)=i(t) i(t). (2.1)
10An alternative interpretation can be given as follows. Each agent exits from his population according
to the Poisson process with parameter  and is replaced by his successor. Agents make once-and-for-all
decisions upon entry, i.e., an agent cannot change his action once it is chosen.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 161
In (2.1), i(t) 2 (Ai) denotes the action distribution of the agents in population i
who have a revision opportunity during the short time interval [t,t +dt). In particular,
if for some action proﬁle a = (ai)i2I 2 A, i(t) = ai for all i 2 I and all t  0, then the
resulting feasible path, which converges linearly to a, is called a linear path to a.
Denote by i the set of feasible paths for population i, and let  =
Q
i i and  i = Q
j6=i j. For x 2
Q
i (Ai), the set of feasible paths starting from x is denoted by x =
Q
i i
x. For each x 2
Q
i (Ai), x is convex and compact in the topology of uniform
convergence on compact intervals.11
An agent in population i anticipates the future evolution of the action distribution,
and, if given the opportunity to switch actions, commits to an action that maximizes his
expected discounted payoff. Since the duration of the commitment has an exponential
distributionwithmean1,theexpecteddiscountedpayoffofcommittingtoactionh 2Ai











where  > 0 is a common discount rate (relative to  = 1). We view the discounted
average duration of a commitment, = = , as the degree of friction. Note that V is
well-deﬁned whenever  > 1.
Given a feasible path  2, let BRi()(t) be the set of best responses in pure strate-




Note that for each i 2 I, the correspondence BRi : R+ !Ai is upper semi-continuous
since Vi is continuous.
A perfect foresight path is a feasible path along which each agent optimizes against
the correctly anticipated future path.
Definition 2.2. A feasible path  is a perfect foresight path if for all i 2 I, all h 2Ai, and
almost all t 0,
˙ ih(t)> ih(t))h 2BRi()(t).
Note that ˙ ih(t) >  ih(t) (i.e., ih(t) > 0 in (2.1)) implies that action h is taken
by some positive fraction of the agents in population i having a revision opportunity
during the short time interval [t,t +dt). The deﬁnition says that such an action must
be a best response to the path  itself.
As we observe in Remark 2.2, a perfect foresight path from x 2  is equivalent to a
Nash equilibrium of an N-player differential game in which each population i 2 I acts
as a single player, who chooses a feasible path from the set i
x and whose payoff is given
by the sum of discounted values of ui.
11One can instead use the topology induced by the discounted sup norm.162 Oyama, Takahashi, and Hofbauer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
2.3 Best response correspondence
For a given initial state x 2
Q
i (Ai), a best response path for population i to a feasible
path  2 x is a feasible path  i 2 i
x along which every agent takes an optimal action
against . This deﬁnes the best response correspondence i
x : x !i
x, which maps each
feasible path  2x to the set of best response paths for population i:
i
x()=f i 2i
x j ˙  ih(t)>  ih(t))h 2BRi()(t) a.e.g.
Let x : x ! x be deﬁned by x() =
Q
i i
x(). We denote by :  !  the extension
of x to , i.e., ()=(0)() for  2.
A perfect foresight path  with (0) = x is a ﬁxed point of x : x ! x, i.e.,  2
x(). The existence of perfect foresight paths follows, due to Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem, from the fact that x is a nonempty-, convex-, and compact-valued upper
semi-continuous correspondence. This fact can be shown by either of the two char-
acterizations given below.
Remark 2.1. For a given feasible path  2 x, a best response path   2 x() is a Lips-
chitz solution to the differential inclusion
˙  (t)2 F()(t)  (t) a.e.,  (0)=x,
where F : R+ !
Q
i (Ai) is deﬁned by
Fi()(t)=fi 2(Ai)jih >0)h 2BRi()(t)g, (2.2)
which is the convex hull of BRi()(t). Since F()() is convex- and compact-valued,
and upper semi-continuous, the existence theorem for differential inclusions (see, e.g.,
AubinandCellina1984,Theorem2.1.4)impliesthenonemptinessofthesetofsolutions,
x(). The convexity of x() is obvious. Furthermore, we can show that x() is com-
pact and depends upper semi-continuously on . For these properties of x, we need
only the upper semi-continuity of BRi, which is in turn implied by the continuity of Vi.
Lemma 2.1. x is compact-valued and upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Since the values are contained in the compact set x, it is sufﬁcient to show
that x has a closed graph. Let fkg1
k=1 and f kg1
k=1 be such that  k 2 x(k), and
assume that k !  and  k !   as k ! 1. Take any i 2 I, h 2 Ai, and t  0 such that
˙  ih(t)>  ih(t). We want to show that h 2BRi()(t).




for some tk 2(t  ",t +"). Take a sequence f"`g1
`=1 such that "` >0 and "` !0 as `!1.
Then,wecantakeasubsequencef k`g1
`=1 off kg1





for some t` 2 (t  "`,t +"`). By assumption, h 2 BRi(k`)(t`) for all `. Now let ` ! 1.
Since BRi()() is upper semi-continuous, we have h 2BRi()(t). Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 163
Remark 2.2. The correspondence i
x is actually the best response correspondence for
anassociateddifferentialgame,asconstructedinHofbauerandSorger(2002). Giventhe
stage game G, the discount rate  > 0, and an initial state x 2
Q
i (Ai), the associated
differential game is an N-player normal form game in which the set of actions for player
i 2 I is i





As shown by Hofbauer and Sorger (2002), the perfect foresight paths are precisely the
Nash equilibria of this game, due to the following fact.






Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.1 in Hofbauer and Sorger (2002). 
The continuity of Ji, the quasi-concavity of Ji(, i), and the compactness of i
x
therefore imply the desired properties of i
x.
2.4 Stability concepts
Theconstantpath ¯  givenby ¯ (t)=x 2
Q
i (Ai)forallt 0isaperfectforesightpath
if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Nevertheless, there may exist
another perfect foresight path starting at x that converges to a different Nash equilib-
rium; that is to say, self-fulﬁlling beliefs may enable the society to escape from a Nash
equilibrium. When the degree of friction  > 0 is sufﬁciently small, this may happen
even from a strict Nash equilibrium. In fact, in 2  2 coordination games, there ex-
ists a perfect foresight path from the risk-dominated equilibrium to the risk-dominant
equilibrium for small  > 0, but not vice versa. This motivates the following stability
concepts.
Definition 2.3. (i) x 2
Q
i (Ai) is absorbing if there exists " >0 such that any perfect
foresight path from any x 2 B"(x) converges to x.
(ii) a 2 A is linearly absorbing if there exists " > 0 such that for any x 2 B"(a), the
linear path to a is a unique perfect foresight path from x.
(iii) x 2
Q
i (Ai)isaccessible fromx 2
Q
i (Ai)ifthereexistsaperfectforesightpath
from x that converges to x. x is globally accessible if it is accessible from any x.
If x is absorbing and the current state is close enough to x, then along any (not
necessarily unique) perfect foresight path, the behavior pattern of the society converges
tox. Linear absorption is a stronger concept than absorption:12 if a is linearly absorb-
ing and the current state is close enough to a, then the perfect foresight path is unique,
12No example is known of a state that is absorbing but not linearly absorbing. We show that in super-




Figure 2.1. A 22 coordination game.
along which every agent at every revision opportunity takes the action prescribed in a.
If a (linearly) absorbing state is also globally accessible, then it is the unique (linearly)
absorbingstate; ifagloballyaccessiblestateisalsoabsorbing, thenitistheuniqueglob-
ally accessible state.
A globally accessible state is not necessarily absorbing, as there are generally multi-
ple perfect foresight paths from a given initial state. We present a (nondegenerate) ex-
ample in Section 4.3.4 that has two globally accessible states for small ; by deﬁnition,
neither of them is absorbing.
Any absorbing or globally accessible state is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game,
which follows from the following proposition.




Proof. Suppose thatx is the limit of a perfect foresight path . Let ¯  be the constant
path at x, i.e., ¯ (t) = x for all t  0. Let t be the feasible path deﬁned by t(s) =
(s +t) for all s 0. Then ftgt0 converges to ¯  as t !1.
Take any i 2 I and any h 2 Ai with x
ih > 0. Then, there exists a sequence ftkg1
k=1
such that tk ! 1 as k ! 1 and h 2 BRi()(tk) = BRi(tk)(0) for any k since  is a
perfect foresight path that converges to x. Let k ! 1. By the upper semi-continuity of
BRi()(0), we have h 2BRi( ¯ )(0)=bri(x
 i). 
2.5 22 case
Before starting our analysis of general supermodular games, we illustrate in a simple
2  2 game example how our stability concepts allow us to discriminate among strict
Nash equilibrium outcomes. Consider the symmetric 22 coordination game given in
Figure2.1,wherea >b andd >c sothat0=(0,0)and1=(1,1)arestrictNashequilibria.
Note that this game is supermodular.
Assume that a  b < d  c so that 1 risk-dominates 0. In the following, we review
the result by Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) that 1 is the unique state that is linearly
absorbing and globally accessible for any sufﬁciently small  >0.
Deﬁne the function u : [0,1]!R by
ui(xj1)=ui(1,(1 xj1,xj1)) ui(0,(1 xj1,xj1)),
where ui(xj1) denotes the payoff difference between the actions 1 and 0 for agents inTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 165
population i when the fraction xj1 of agents in j 6= i play action 1. Note that ui is




by the assumption that 1 is a risk-dominant equilibrium.
To verify the global accessibility of 1 for small , let the initial condition be x0 = 0
and consider the linear path  from 0 to 1, given by j1(t)=1 e t, along which every
agent switches to action 1 at his ﬁrst revision opportunity. Consider an agent in i who


















ui()d>0 as  !0, (2.3)
which implies that this agent has an incentive to switch to action 1 provided that  is
sufﬁciently small. Due to the supermodularity, this in turn implies that 1 is globally




j1(0) 2 [0,1], we have j1(t)  0
j1(t) for all t  0 and hence
Vi()(0)Vi(0)(0), sinceui isincreasing. (Thisobservationisextendedtogeneral
supermodular games in Section 3.2.)
Along the path , all the agents are playing action 0 at time 0, but will eventually
switch to action 1 in the future. For agent 0, the decision is whether to already commit
to action 1, which is suboptimal in the present but will become optimal in the future, or
to stay with the currently optimal action 0, postponing the switch to action 1 to a next or
later revision opportunity. In the presence of positive time discounting  > 0, the agent
assigns larger weights to lower values of  2 [0,1] in computing Vi(). In the limit as
 ! 0, however, all the ’s receive an equal weight, as seen in (2.3). Since 1 is a risk-
dominant equilibrium and hence we have
R 1
0 ui()d>0, this implies that, when  is
small, the relative return from the future coordination on 1 is large enough, so that the
agent chooses to commit to action 1.
To verify the linear absorption of 1, let the initial condition be x0 = 1 and consider
the linear path   from 1 to 0, given by  j1(t)=e t, along which every agent switches to
action 0 at his ﬁrst revision opportunity. Consider again an agent who is given a revision
















which implies that the agent has an incentive to stick to action 1 for any  > 0 (observe
that Vi( )(0) is increasing in , as ui is increasing). That is, since the risk-dominated
action 0 does not perform well enough to compensate the loss from not playing the
currently optimal action 1, the agent chooses action 1 at this revision opportunity, in-
tending to switch to action 0 at a future opportunity. However, this is the case for all
the agents revising at time 0, so that the escaping path   cannot be a perfect foresight
path. Moreover, since, due to the supermodularity, the path   is the best scenario for
action 0 to be played, action 1 is the best response to any feasible path from 1. It thus
follows that the only perfect foresight path from 1 is the constant path at 1. Since the
argument above remains valid when the initial condition lies in a small neighborhood
of 1, we conclude that 1 is linearly absorbing.
3. Supermodularity and monotonicity
Inasupermodulargame, theactionsareorderedsothateachplayer’smarginalpayoffto
any increase in his action is nondecreasing in other players’ actions. In this section, we
ﬁrst identify monotone properties of the perfect foresight dynamics for supermodular
stage games. In particular, we observe the monotonicity of the best response corre-
spondence  with respect to a partial order on  induced by the stochastic dominance
relation over mixed strategies. We then prove a comparison theorem for the perfect
foresight paths associated with two different stage games that are comparable in terms
of best responses. This theorem implies that if at least one of the two games is super-
modular, then one game inherits stability properties from the other. Finally, we show
that for supermodular games, stability under perfect foresight is equivalent to that un-
der rationalizable foresight (Matsui and Oyama 2006).
3.1 Supermodular games







for all h 2 Ai. For x,y 2
Q
i (Ai), we write x ­ y if xi ­ yi for all i 2 I and x i ­ y i if
xj ­ yj for all j 6= i. Moreover, we deﬁne i ­  i for i, i 2 i by i(t) ­  i(t) for all
t  0;  ­   for ,  2  by i ­  i for all i 2 I; and  i ­   i for  i,  i 2  i byTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 167
j ­ j for all j 6=i. Note that if (0)­ (0) and ˙ (t)+(t)­ ˙  (t)+ (t) for almost all








for all t 0.
ThegameG issupermodular ifwheneverh <k,thedifferenceui(k,a i) ui(h,a i)
is nondecreasing in a i 2A i, i.e., if a i b i, then
ui(k,a i) ui(h,a i)ui(k,b i) ui(h,b i).
It is well known that this property extends to mixed strategies: if h < k and x i ­ y i,
then
ui(k,x i) ui(h,x i)ui(k,y i) ui(h,y i).
The expected discounted payoff function Vi preserves this property, implying that BRi
is monotone with respect to the partial order on .
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. For ,  2 , if  i ­   i,
then for all t 0,
Vik()(t) Vih()(t)Vik( )(t) Vih( )(t)
for h <k, and
minBRi()(t)minBRi( )(t)
maxBRi()(t)maxBRi( )(t).
















Next, let k =minBRi()(t). For any h <k,
Vik( )(t) Vih( )(t)Vik()(t) Vih()(t)>0
since h = 2 BRi()(t). Hence, if ` 2 BRi( )(t), then `  k = minBRi()(t). We thus have
minBRi( )(t)minBRi()(t).
The other claim that maxBRi()(t)maxBRi( )(t) can be proved similarly. 
The next proposition establishes the monotonicity of the best response correspon-
dence i over . For  2 , a feasible path  
i 2 i() is the smallest element of i()
if  
i ­ 0
i for all 0
i 2 i(), and +




i 2i(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Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. For  2 , i() has




Proof. Take  and   such that i(0) =xi,  i(0) = yi, xi ­ yi, and  i ­   i. First, we
construct  
i =mini(); the construction of maxi() is similar. Deﬁne
i(t)=minBRi()(t),
where the right hand side is considered to be a mixed strategy. Note that i is lower
semi-continuous, and hence measurable, since BRi()() is an upper semi-continuous













i 2 i(), and  
i ­ 0
i for all 0
i 2 i(), i.e.,  
i is the smallest
element of i().
On the other hand, any path  0








i : R+ ! (Ai) such that 0
i(t) 2 Fi( )(t) for almost all t  0, where Fi( ) is
deﬁned by (2.2). Since  i ­  i, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that
minBRi()(t)minBRi( )(t),
and hence i(t) ­ 0
i(t) for almost all t. Together with the assumption that xi ­ yi,
this implies that  
i ­  0
i (recall (3.1)), thereby completing the proof that mini() ­
mini( ). 
3.2 Comparison theorem
Fix the set of players, I, and the set of action proﬁles, A. Consider two games G =




or that for all i 2 I and all i 2(A i),
maxbri
vi(i)maxbri
ui(i), (3.3)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 169
where bri
ui(i) and bri
vi(i) are the sets of best responses to i in the games G and G0,
respectively. In this subsection, we study the relationship between the perfect foresight
paths for the stage gameG and those forG0. Note that the state space
Q
i (Ai) is com-
mon to both cases. We show that if G or G0 is supermodular, then the perfect foresight
dynamics preserve the order of best responses between G and G0, and therefore G in-
herits stability properties fromG0.
To specify the payoff functions, we denote by BRi
ui()(t) (respectively BRi
vi()(t))
the set of best responses for population i to a feasible path  at time t when the stage





with a probability distribution t


















The following lemma is a key to our comparison theorem. The proof relies on a ﬁxed
point argument together with the monotonicity of BRi.
Lemma 3.2. Let x,y 2
Q
i (Ai) be such that y ­x.
(i) Suppose that G and G0 satisfy (3.2) and that G or G0 is supermodular. If a feasible
path  2x is such that for all i 2 I, all h 2Ai, and almost all t 0,
˙ ih(t)> ih(t))h minBRi
ui()(t), (3.4)
then there exists a perfect foresight path   2y for G0 such that   ­.
(ii) Suppose that G and G0 satisfy (3.3) and that G or G0 is supermodular. If a feasible
path  2y is such that for all i 2 I, all h 2Ai, and almost all t 0,
˙  ih(t)>  ih(t))h maxBRi
vi( )(t),
then there exists a perfect foresight path  2x for G such that  ­.
Proof. We show only (i). Given x,y 2
Q
i (Ai) with y ­ x and  2 x satisfying (3.4),
deﬁne the convex and compact subset ˜ y y by
˜ y =f 2y j ­g.170 Oyama, Takahashi, and Hofbauer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Let G0 be the best response correspondence for the stage gameG0. We deﬁne a convex-
and compact-valued and upper semi-continuous correspondence ˜ G0: ˜ y ! ˜ y by
˜ G0( )=G0( )\ ˜ y ( 2 ˜ y).
We want to show that ˜ G0( ) is nonempty for any   2 ˜ y. Then, it follows from Kaku-
tani’s ﬁxed point theorem that ˜ G0 has a ﬁxed point   2 ˜ G0( ) ˜ y, which is a perfect
foresight path forG0 and satisﬁes   ­.

















for all h such that ˙ ih(t)> ih(t).




i(t) a.e.,  0
i(0)=yi




vi( )(t)­ ˙ i(t)+i(t) (3.6)
for all i and almost all t, since (3.5) holds for all h such that ˙ ih(t)+ih(t) > 0. From
(3.6) along with  0(0) = y ­ x = (0), it follows that  0 ­  (recall (3.1)), i.e.,  0 2
˜ y. Therefore, we have  0 2 ˜ G0( ) = G0( )\ ˜ y, which implies the nonemptiness of
˜ G0( ). 
As a corollary, we have the following result, which is an analogue of the comparison
theorem from the theory of differential equations (Walter 1970) or monotone (coopera-
tive) dynamical systems (Smith 1995) and of the comparative statics theorem (Milgrom
and Roberts 1990).
Theorem 3.1. Let x,y 2
Q
i (Ai) be such that y ­x.
(i) Suppose that G and G0 satisfy (3.2) and that G or G0 is supermodular. For any
perfect foresight path  for G with (0) = x, there exists a perfect foresight path
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(ii) Suppose that G and G0 satisfy (3.3) and that G or G0 is supermodular. For any
perfect foresight path   for G0 with  (0) = y, there exists a perfect foresight path
 for G with (0)=x such that   ­.
Suppose thatG orG0 is supermodular. This theorem implies that ifG is comparable
(in terms of best responses) to G0, then G inherits stability properties from G0. First,
assume thatG andG0 satisfy (3.2) and that the action proﬁle maxA =(ni)i2I is (linearly)
absorbing in G0. Take any state x 2 B"(maxA) for a sufﬁciently small " > 0 and any
perfect foresight path  for G with (0) = x. By Theorem 3.1(i), there exists a perfect
foresight path   forG0 with  (0)=x such that   ­. By the assumption that maxA
is (linearly) absorbing inG0,   converges (linearly) to maxA, so that  also converges
(linearly) to maxA. This implies that maxA is (linearly) absorbing inG as well.
Second, assume that G and G0 satisfy (3.3) and that maxA is globally accessible in
G0. Take any state x 2
Q
i (Ai). By the assumption that maxA is globally accessible in
G0, there exists a perfect foresight path   forG0 with  (0)=x that converges to maxA.
By Theorem 3.1(ii), there exists a perfect foresight path  forG with (0)=x such that
  ­ . Since   converges to maxA,  also converges to maxA. This implies that
maxA is globally accessible inG as well.
Note that by reversing the orders of the actions, the above arguments can be applied
to minA.
A candidate for the game G0 is a potential game. Such a case is considered, with
some reﬁnement, in Section 4.
Lemma 3.2 with G0 = G (i.e., vi = ui for all i 2 I) yields the following corollary. We
say that a feasible path  is a superpath if
˙ ih(t)> ih(t))h minBRi()(t)
for all i 2 I, all h 2Ai, and almost all t 0; a feasible path   is a subpath if
˙  ih(t)>  ih(t))h maxBRi( )(t)
for all i 2 I, all h 2Ai, and almost all t 0.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. Let x,y 2
Q
i (Ai) be such
that y ­x.
(i) If there exists a superpath  with (0)=x, then there exists a perfect foresight path
  with  (0)=y such that   ­.
(ii) If there exists a subpath   with  (0) = y, then there exists a perfect foresight path
 with (0)=x such that  ­.
This lemma is used to prove the following propositions.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. If x 2
Q
i (Ai) is ab-




Figure 3.1. A globally accessible, non-strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. InlightofProposition2.1,itissufﬁcienttoshowthatanyNashequilibriumthat
is not a strict Nash equilibrium is not absorbing. Suppose that x is a non-strict Nash
equilibrium. We show the existence of an escaping path from x.
Let a0
i (respectively a00
i ) be the smallest (respectively the largest) in bri(x
 i) for each
player i, and let a0 =(a0
i)i2I and a00 =(a00
i )i2I, which are considered to be mixed strategy
proﬁles. Note that a0 ­ x ­ a00 and, by the deﬁnition of a non-strict Nash equilibrium,
a0 6=a00, so that a0 or a00 is different from x. Let us assume that a0 6=x.
Now denote by ¯  the constant path such that ¯ (t) = x for all t. Note that
BRi( ¯ )(t) = bri(x
 i), so that minBRi( ¯ )(t) = a0
i for all t. Let  be the feasible path
starting from x and converging linearly to a0, i.e.,
(t)=e tx +(1 e t)a0.
This path satisﬁes  ­ ¯ ,  6= ¯ , and ˙ ih(t)> ih(t) only for h =a0
i. We also have
a0
i =minBRi( ¯ )(t)minBRi()(t),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.1. This means that  is a superpath. There-
fore, it follows from Lemma 3.3 that there exists a perfect foresight path   fromx such
that   ­, which does not converge to x. 
The next proposition shows the equivalence of absorption and linear absorption for
supermodular games. A proof is given in Section A.1, in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. If a 2 A is absorbing,
then it is linearly absorbing.
A globally accessible state need not in general be a strict Nash equilibrium. Even
in the class of strict supermodular games, there are degenerate games for which a non-
strict, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is globally accessible. In the game given by Fig-
ure 3.1, the non-strict Nash equilibrium (0,1) is globally accessible for any degree of
friction. It is an open problem whether every globally accessible state must be a pure
Nash equilibrium in generic supermodular games.
3.3 Stability under rationalizable foresight
The concept of a perfect foresight path requires that agents maximize their future dis-
counted payoffs against their beliefs about the future path of the action distribution
and that these beliefs coincide with the actual path. Relaxing the latter requirement,
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this model, while the rationality of agents as well as the structure of the society is com-
mon knowledge, beliefs about the future path are not necessarily coordinated among
agents. It is assumed instead that agents form their beliefs in a rationalizable manner:
in particular, they may misforecast the future. In this subsection, we consider stabil-
ity under rationalizable foresight dynamics and show that in supermodular games, an
absorbingandgloballyaccessiblestateunderperfectforesightdynamicsisuniquelyab-
sorbing under rationalizable foresight dynamics as well.
Following Matsui and Oyama (2006), we deﬁne rationalizable foresight paths as fol-
lows. First let 	0 be the set of all feasible paths, . Then for each positive integer k,




8i 2 I,8h 2Ai,a.a.t 0:
 ˙  ih(t)>  ih(t)
)9 0 2	k 1 : 0(s)= (s)8s 2[0,t] and h 2BRi( 0)(t)
	
.
Along a path in 	k, an agent with a revision opportunity at time t takes a best response
to some path in 	k 1 while knowing the past history up to time t.13 Let 	 =
T1
k=0	k.
Definition 3.1. A path in 	 is a rationalizable foresight path.
Our concept of rationalizable foresight path differs from rationalizability in the as-
sociated differential game deﬁned in Remark 2.2. The former incorporates the feature
of societal games that different agents in a population can have different beliefs and a
single agent can have different beliefs at different revision opportunities, while for the
latter, each population acts as a single player, who makes his decision only at time zero.
Along every rationalizable foresight path, each agent optimizes against some, possi-
bly different, rationalizable foresight path. We state this without a proof, as it is essen-
tially the same as Proposition 3.3 in Matsui and Oyama (2006).
Proposition 3.4. A feasible path   2  is contained in 	 if and only if for all i 2 I, all
h 2 Ai, and almost all t  0 such that ˙  ih(t) >   ih(t), there exists  0 2 	 such that
 0(s)= (s) for all s 2[0,t] and h 2BRi( 0)(t).
As in one-shot games, we have the following relationship between perfect and ratio-
nalizable foresight paths. This is veriﬁed by observing that every perfect foresight path
is contained in each 	k.
Lemma 3.4. A perfect foresight path is a rationalizable foresight path.
We deﬁne absorption under rationalizable foresight analogously to that under per-
fect foresight.14
Definition 3.2. x 2
Q
i (Ai) is absorbing under rationalizable foresight if there exists
" >0 such that any rationalizable foresight path from any x 2 B"(x) converges to x.
13Since the environment is stationary and BR
i()(t) depends only on the behavior of  after time t, in
the deﬁnition of 	k one can equivalently take  0 as a path in 	k 1 that satisﬁes only  0(t)= (t).
14Wecandeﬁneglobalaccessibilityunderrationalizableforesightinasimilarmanner. DuetoLemma3.4,
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An absorbing state under rationalizable foresight is also absorbing under perfect
foresight due to Lemma 3.4, but not vice versa in general (see Examples 3.1 and 3.2 in
Matsui and Oyama 2006). As noted, in rationalizable foresight dynamics, agents are al-
lowed to have different beliefs at various revision opportunities, and these beliefs need
only be rationalizable and thus may be misforecasts about the actual course of future
play. Hence, it is generally easier for the action distribution to escape from an equi-
librium state under rationalizable foresight than under perfect foresight. Nevertheless,
for supermodular games we can show that absorption under perfect foresight is in fact
equivalent to that under rationalizable foresight.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. Then x 2
Q
i (Ai) is ab-
sorbing underrationalizable foresightif and onlyif it isabsorbing underperfect foresight.
Therefore,insupermodulargames,anabsorbingandgloballyaccessiblestateunder
perfect foresight is the unique state that is absorbing under rationalizable foresight.
The “if” part of this theorem follows from the lemma below, an analogue of the fact
in general supermodular games that the set of rationalizable strategy proﬁles has small-
estandlargestelements,andtheseelementsarepure-strategyNashequilibria(Milgrom
and Roberts 1990). For x 2
Q
i (Ai), let 	k






x =	 \x, i.e., 	
x is the set of rationalizable foresight paths from x.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. Then 	
x has smallest and
largest elements, and these elements are perfect foresight paths.
Proof. We show that 	
x has a smallest element and that it is a perfect foresight path.
Let 0 be the smallest feasible path from x (i.e., the linear path from x to minA) and k
the smallest best response path to k 1, which is given by
˙ k
i (t)=minBRi(k 1)(t) k
i (t) a.e., k
i (0)=xi.
Then fkg1
k=0 is an increasing sequence in the compact set x, so that fkg1
k=0 con-
verges to some  2 x. By the upper semi-continuity of x,  is a perfect foresight
path, and hence, an element of 	
x by Lemma 3.4.
It sufﬁces to show that  is a lower bound of 	
x. We show that k is a lower bound
of 	k
x (	
x) for all k. It follows that the limit  is also a lower bound of 	
x.
First, 0 is a lower bound of 	0
x. Then, suppose that k 1 is a lower bound of 	k 1
x .
Fix any   2 	k
x, and take any i and any t such that k
i and  i are differentiable at
t. For any h such that ˙  ih(t) >   ih(t), we have h 2 BRi( 0)(t) for some  0 2 	k 1
x .
Sincek 1 ­ 0 byassumption,itfollowsfromthesupermodularityandLemma3.1that
minBRi(k 1)(t)minBRi( 0)(t)h. Therefore, wehave ˙ k
i (t)+k
i (t)­ ˙  i(t)+ i(t)
for almost all t, which implies that k ­ . Hence, k is a lower bound of 	k
x. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. “If” part: Take any rationalizable foresight path   from x suf-
ﬁciently close to x. By Lemma 3.5, there exist perfect foresight paths  and 0 from x
such that  ­   ­ 0. If x is absorbing under perfect foresight, then both  and 0
converge to x, and therefore,   also converges to x.
“Only if” part: Follows from Lemma 3.4. Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 175
Remark 3.1. All the results in this section, as well as Lemma 2.1, hold in more general
settings (after appropriate modiﬁcations, replacing “ i ­   i” with “ ­  ”, and bri
with BRi) where Vi()(): R+ ! Rni+1 is continuous and Vi()(t):  ! Rni+1 is super-
modular, i.e., if  ­ , then
Vik()(t) Vih()(t)Vik( )(t) Vih( )(t)
for k >h. Examples of such functions include the expected discounted payoffs induced
by the stage game where the payoff to an agent in population i taking action h 2 Ai is
given by a continuous function gih:
Q
i (Ai) ! R. Note here that the payoff function
for an agent in population i may depend on the action distribution within population
i itself and may not be N-linear in
Q
i (Ai). Such payoff functions can describe ran-
dommatchingmodelswithinasinglepopulation,consideredinMatsuiandMatsuyama
(1995), Hofbauer and Sorger (1999), and Oyama (2002), as well as models with nonlin-
ear payoffs, considered in Matsuyama (1991, 1992) and Kaneda (1995). In alternative
settings, Vi may depend on the past behavior of .
4. Games with monotone potentials
This section applies the monotonicity argument developed in the previous section to
games with monotone potentials introduced by Morris and Ui (2005). Suppose that the
games G and G0 satisfy (3.2) or (3.3). Roughly speaking, G has a monotone potential if
G0 can be chosen to be a potential game, and the action proﬁle maxA is a monotone po-
tential maximizer ofG if it is the unique potential maximizer ofG0. For potential games,
Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) show that the unique potential maximizer is absorbing and
globally accessible for any small degree of friction. Therefore we can conclude from
Theorem 3.1 and the subsequent discussion that ifG orG0 is supermodular, then maxA
is absorbing (if (3.2) is satisﬁed) and globally accessible (if (3.3) is satisﬁed) for any small
degree of friction in the stage gameG.
For the precise deﬁnition, which is given in the following subsection, two remarks
are in order. First, when G0 is a potential game, a condition weaker than both (3.2) and
(3.3) is sufﬁcient for the global accessibility result. Morris and Ui’s (2005) deﬁnition
of monotone potential employs this weaker version (Deﬁnition 4.1), while (3.2) corre-
sponds to what we call strict monotone potential (Deﬁnition 4.2). Second, in order to
deﬁnetheconceptforactionproﬁlesa otherthanmaxA orminA,weneedtodividethe
set of actions for each player i into two parts: the actions below a
i and those above a
i.
4.1 Monotone potential maximizer
Fix an action proﬁle a 2 A. Let A 
i = fh 2 Ai j h  a
ig and A+
i = fh 2 Ai j h  a
ig. For a
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where f (h,i) =
P
a i2A i i(a i) f (h,a i). We employ the following simpliﬁed version
of monotone potential.15
Definition 4.1. The action proﬁle a 2 A is a monotone potential maximizer, or MP-
maximizer, ofG if there exists a function v : A ! R with v(a) > v(a) for all a 6= a such












Such a function v is called a monotone potential function for a.
In addition, we introduce a slight reﬁnement of the notion of an MP-maximizer.16
Definition 4.2. The action proﬁle a 2 A is a strict monotone potential maximizer, or
strict MP-maximizer, of G if there exists a function v : A ! R with v(a) > v(a) for all












Such a function v is called a strict monotone potential function for a.
Recall that in a potential game, the best response correspondences are exactly equal
to those in the corresponding common interest game whose payoffs are given by the
potentialfunction. Indeﬁningamonotonepotentialfunctionv foragameG, equalities
are replaced with inequalities, so that the best responses in G are bounded by those
(restricted to A  and A+) in the potential game Gv. With supermodularity in G or Gv,
this sufﬁces to allowG to inherit properties of potential games.
A (strict) MP-maximizer is a (strict) Nash equilibrium. A strict MP-maximizer is al-
ways an MP-maximizer, but the converse is not true. In a degenerate game (with at least
twoaction proﬁles)wherepayoffsare constantforeachplayer, alltheaction proﬁlesbe-
comeMP-maximizers,whilenoneofthemisastrictMP-maximizer. Foragenericchoice
of payoffs, an MP-maximizer is a strict MP-maximizer. For supermodular games, a strict
MP-maximizer is unique if it exists, due to Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, given subsequently.
ThenotionofanMP-maximizeruniﬁesseveralexistingconcepts. Auniqueweighted
potential maximizer is a strict MP-maximizer. A (strict) p-dominant equilibrium with P
i2I pi < 1 is a (strict) MP-maximizer. For games with diminishing marginal returns,
the notion of an MP-maximizer reduces to that of a local potential maximizer (Morris
1999 and Morris and Ui 2005). See Section 4.3 for details.
15In Morris and Ui (2005) a monotone potential function is deﬁned on a given partition of A.
16Morris (1999) introduces a version of MP-maximizer that is stronger than our concept of a strict MP-
maximizer: if a is an MP-maximizer in the sense of Morris (1999), then it is a strict MP-maximizer, but not
vice versa in general.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 177
4.2 Results

















f (h,a i) for x i 2
Q
j6=i (Aj). Let Gv =
(I,(Ai)i2I,(v)i2I) be the potential game in which all players have the common payoff
function v. We have the following two theorems. Their proofs are given in Sections A.2
and A.3, in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that the stage gameG has an MP-maximizer a with a monotone
potential function v. If G or Gv is supermodular, then there exists ¯  > 0 such that a is
globally accessible for all  2(0, ¯ ).
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the stage game G has a strict MP-maximizer a with a strict
monotone potential function v. If G or Gv is supermodular, then a is linearly absorbing
for all  >0.
In particular, a strict MP-maximizer is the unique linearly absorbing (and globally
accessible) state for any small degree of friction, ifG orGv is supermodular.
Note that, in order for Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 to apply, it is sufﬁcient that at least
one of the gamesG andGv be supermodular. Indeed, in the special case considered in
Section 4.3.1, the original gameG need not be a supermodular game, and Section 4.3.3
presents a numerical example of a non-supermodular game that has a supermodular
monotone potential function.
Given an MP-maximizer a and a monotone potential v, observe that the restricted
games G 
v = (I,(A 
i )i2I,(v)i2I) and G+
v = (I,(A+
i )i2I,(v)i2I) are potential games with the
unique potential maximizer a. The proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 utilize this observa-
tion to apply results on potential games by Hofbauer and Sorger (2002).
The proofs proceed as follows. Suppose that a is an MP-maximizer with a mono-
tone potential function v. Observe (for the case where a = maxA) that (4.1) is weaker











i (t) a.e., +
i (0)=maxAi
for all i 2 I, and limt!1 (t) = limt!1+(t) = a. Notice that   (respectively +)






i )), and actually a perfect foresight
path for the stage gameG 
v (respectivelyG+
v ).
To obtain these paths, we use the fact that if the stage game is a potential game, then
any solution to a certain optimal control problem is a perfect foresight path, and when
the friction  > 0 is sufﬁciently small, it converges to the potential maximizer a. Fix
such a small . We show that a minimal (respectively maximal) solution to the optimal
control problem associated withG 
v (respectivelyG+
v ) satisﬁes the above conditions.178 Oyama, Takahashi, and Hofbauer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Then, an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 3.2 allows us to show that if
G orGv is supermodular, then for any x 2
Q
i (Ai) there exists a perfect foresight path
 with (0) = x such that   ­  ­ +. Since   and + converge to a,  also
converges to a. This implies that a is globally accessible for a small friction.
Next, suppose that a is a strict MP-maximizer with a strict monotone potential
function v. Take any perfect foresight path  starting from a state sufﬁciently close
to a. As in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we can show that if G or Gv is supermodular, then
thereexistfeasiblepaths  and+ startingfromstatessufﬁcientlyclosetoa suchthat
  ­  ­ + and that   and + are perfect foresight paths for the restricted games
G 
v and G+
v , respectively. Since a, the potential maximizer of G 
v and G+
v , is absorbing
in G 
v and G+
v ,   and + converge to a, and therefore,  also converges to a. In
the case where G is supermodular, this implies that a is linearly absorbing in G, due
to Proposition 3.3. In the case whereGv is supermodular, a is linearly absorbing inG 
v
andG+
v , sothat  and+ convergelinearlytoa. Therefore,  alsoconvergeslinearly
to a, implying the linear absorption of a inG.
4.3 Examples
This subsection provides special cases of games with monotone potentials. An example
is also presented in Section 4.3.4 in which there are multiple globally accessible states
for small frictions, so that the game admits no monotone potential.17
4.3.1 p-dominance Letp=(p1,...,pN)2[0,1)N. Thenotionofp-dominance(Kajiiand
Morris 1997) is a many-player, many-action generalization of risk-dominance.
Definition 4.3. (i) An action proﬁle a 2 A is a p-dominant equilibrium of G if for all
i 2 I, a
i 2bri(i) holds for all i 2(A i) with i(a
 i)pi.
(ii) An action proﬁle a is a strict p-dominant equilibrium of G if for all i 2 I, fa
ig =
bri(i) holds for all i 2(A i) with i(a
 i)>pi.
A p-dominant equilibrium with low enough p is an MP-maximizer with a monotone
potential function that is supermodular (with an appropriate re-ordering of actions).
Lemma 4.1. If a is a (strict) p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i2I pi < 1, then a is a









where C(a)=fi 2 I jai =a
ig.
A proof is given in Section A.4, in the Appendix.
17Morris(1999)presentsasymmetric44gamethathasnorobustequilibrium, andhencenomonotone
potential, while by the result of Takahashi (2008), this game has an absorbing and globally accessible state
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By relabeling actions so that a
i = maxAi for all i 2 I, we can make v supermodular.
Therefore, we have the following result as a corollary to Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, which
generalizes a result for symmetric two-player games by Oyama (2002, Theorem 3).
Corollary 4.1. (i) A p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i2I pi < 1 is globally accessible for
any small degree of friction.
(ii) A strict p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i2I pi < 1 is linearly absorbing for any de-
gree of friction.
In particular, a strict p-dominant equilibrium with
P
i2I pi <1 is the unique linearly




and show that for games with linear incentives, it implies linear absorption and global
accessibility for small frictions. An action proﬁle a 2 A is said to be
1
2-dominant if for
all i 2 I, fa
ig = bri(x i) holds for all x i 2
Q
j6=i (Aj) such that xja
j 
1
2 for all j 6= i.
For two-player games,
1
2-dominance is equivalent to strict p-dominance with pi <
1
2
for any i 2 I, so that Corollary 4.1 covers their result. For games with more than two
players, there is no obvious relation. Note the difference between i and x i in the
deﬁnitions, where i is a correlated probability distribution over the opponents’ action
proﬁles, while x i is a proﬁle of probability distributions over each opponent’s actions.
4.3.2 Localpotentialmaximizer Weconsiderasimpliﬁedversionofthenotionoflocal
potential maximizer introduced by Morris and Ui (2005) as well as its reﬁnement.
Definition 4.4. (i) An action proﬁle a 2 A is a local potential maximizer, or LP-
maximizer, ofG if there exists a function v : A !R with v(a)>v(a) for all a 6=a
such that for all i 2 I, there exists a function i : Ai ! R+ such that if h < a
i, then






and if h >a






Such a function v is called a local potential function for a.
(ii) An action proﬁle a is a strict local potential maximizer, or strict LP-maximizer,
of G if there exists a function v : A ! R with v(a) > v(a) for all a 6= a such that
for all i 2 I, there exists a function i : Ai ! R++ such that if h < a







18Kojima and Takahashi (forthcoming) give an alternative proof for this result, which does not rely on a
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and if h >a






Such a function v is called a strict local potential function for a.
An LP-maximizer is a strict LP-maximizer if one can take strictly positive numbers
for the weights i.19
The gameG is said to have diminishing marginal returns if for all i 2 I, all h 6= 0,ni,
and all a i 2A i,
ui(h,a i) ui(h  1,a i)ui(h +1,a i) ui(h,a i).
In games with diminishing marginal returns, the MP-maximizer conditions reduce to
the LP-maximizer conditions.
Lemma 4.2. If the game G has a (strict) LP-maximizer a with a (strict) local potential
function v and if G or Gv has diminishing marginal returns, then a is a (strict) MP-
maximizer with the same function v.
A proof is given in Section A.4, in the Appendix. We have the following result as a
corollary of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
Corollary 4.2. (i) Suppose that the stage game G has an LP-maximizer a with a local
potential function v. If G or Gv has diminishing marginal returns and if G or Gv
is supermodular, then a is globally accessible for any small degree of friction.
(ii) Suppose that the stage game G has a strict LP-maximizer a with a strict local po-
tential function v. If G or Gv has diminishing marginal returns and if G or Gv is
supermodular, then a is linearly absorbing for any degree of friction.
In particular, a strict LP-maximizer is the unique linearly absorbing (and globally
accessible) state for any small degree of friction if G or Gv has diminishing marginal
returns andG orGv is supermodular.
4.3.3 Young’sexample Considerthe33gamegiveninFigure4.1(a),takenfromYoung
(1993). Oyama (2002) shows by direct computation that (2,2) is linearly absorbing and
globally accessible for a small degree of friction. In fact, (2,2) is a strict MP-maximizer
withastrictmonotonepotentialfunctionthatissupermodular(Figure4.1(b)),whilethe
original game is not supermodular (for any ordering of actions). Therefore, our results,
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, apply also to this game.
Note that (1,1) is stochastically stable (Young 1993), while it is neither absorbing nor
globally accessible when the friction is small.
19Morris (1999) and Frankel et al. (2003) give a slightly different deﬁnition of LP-maximizer, which is
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0 1 2
0 6,6 0,5 0,0
1 5,0 7,7 5,5
2 0,0 5,5 8,8
(a) Original game
0 1 2
0 6 5 0
1 5 7 5
2 0 5 8
(b) Monotone potential function
Figure 4.1. Young’s example.
4.3.4 Unanimity game with multiple globally accessible states Consider the three-





yi if a =0
zi if a =1
0 otherwise,
where yi,zi > 0 and 0 = (0,0,0),1 = (1,1,1) 2 A. Now let y1 = 6 + c > 0, y2 = y3 = 1,
and z1 = z2 = z3 = 2 (see Figure 4.2). This game is a modiﬁed version of an example in
Morris and Ui (2005, Subsection 7.2).20 If c > 0, then 0 is globally accessible for a small
friction, while if c < 2
p
6, then 1 is globally accessible for a small friction (see an earlier
version of this paper, Oyama et al. 2006, Section 5). Therefore, if 0 < c < 2
p
6, the game
has two globally accessible states simultaneously when the friction is small. Note that 0
(respectively 1) has the higher Nash product if c >2 (respectively c <2).
On the other hand, one can show that if c  0, then 1 is absorbing for any degree of
friction, while if c 2
p
6, then 0 is absorbing for any degree of friction.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we study perfect foresight dynamics à la Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) for
supermodular games and generalizations thereof (games that have a monotone rela-
tion, in terms of best responses, with supermodular games), and elucidate the induced
monotonestructureofthedynamics. Weprove,inparticular,thestabilityofamonotone
potential maximizer, which is known to be robust to incomplete information (Morris
and Ui 2005), thus demonstrating that the prediction obtained by the dynamic stability
approach based on perfect foresight dynamics agrees with that obtained by the incom-
plete information approach in monotone potential games. We also show that for super-
modular games, stability in perfect foresight dynamics coincides with stability under
the less demanding assumption of rationalizable foresight.
We conclude by noting that, beyond the agreement in the formal results, there is
a parallelism at a conceptual level between the two approaches. Perfect foresight dy-
namics, as well as incomplete information games, fall into the class of interaction games
20One can verify that 0 is not an MP-maximizer for any c, while 1 is an MP-maximizer (and hence, robust
to incomplete information) if and only if c <  2. In the case where c   2, nothing seems to be known









Figure 4.2. Multiple globally accessible states.
(Morris 1999, Morris and Shin 2006), in which a type or player interacts with various
subsets of the set of all types/players, and total payoffs are given by the payoffs from dif-
ferent interactions with different weights. Under perfect foresight dynamics, forward-
looking agents make irreversible decisions, so that each agent interacts with agents who
willmakedecisionsinthefutureaswellasthosewhohavemadedecisionsinthepast. A
recentpaperbyTakahashi(2008)provesthatperfectforesightdynamicscanformallybe
understood as a static incomplete information game by identifying the time axis with
the type space. With this interpretation, global accessibility and linear absorption in
perfect foresight dynamics, roughly, correspond respectively to robustness (Kajii and
Morris 1997) and contagion/infection (Morris et al. 1995) in the incomplete informa-
tion game literature. We leave for future research an investigation of the relationship
among these concepts beyond the class of games we study in this paper.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Suppose that the stage game is supermodular and that a 2 A is absorbing (recall from
Proposition 3.2 that in supermodular games, any absorbing state is a pure-strategy
state). We ﬁrst show that a perfect foresight path from a is unique. Denote by ¯  the
constant path at a.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that the stage game is supermodular. If a is absorbing, then ¯  is
the unique perfect foresight path from a.
Proof. Suppose that a is absorbing. Let   and + be the smallest and the largest
perfectforesightpathsfroma,respectively(theseexist,asdemonstratedinLemma3.5,
due to the supermodularity of the stage game). We show that   is nonincreasing in the
sense that  (s) ­  (t) if t  s; a dual argument shows that + is nondecreasing.
Then,   and + must be constant at a; otherwise,   or + would not converge to
a, contradicting the absorption of a.
For each i 2 I, denote by ai the smallest action among h’s such that minBRi( )(t)=
h for some t  0. Note that ai  a
i, since   ­ ¯ , and hence minBRi( )(t) 
minBRi( ¯ )(t)  a
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for h = ai,...,a



















i =1, and let  be the feasible path given by
˙ i(t)=i(t) i(t) a.e., i(0)=a
i
for all i 2 I. Observe that  is nonincreasing and that  ­ .
We show that  is a superpath. Take any i 2 I, h 2 Ai, and t  0 such that ˙ ih(t) >






where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition ofT h
i , the second from the fact that
 ­  , and the third from the fact that  is nonincreasing. This means that  is a
superpath. It therefore follows from Lemma 3.3 that there exists a perfect foresight path
  from a such that   ­.
On the other hand,   is the smallest perfect foresight path from a. Therefore, we
must have   ­ , so that   = = . We conclude that   is nonincreasing. 
We now show that a is linearly absorbing. Note that
BRi( ¯ )(t)=fa
igfor all i 2 I and all t 0, (A.1)
since a is a strict Nash equilibrium by Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Supposethata isabsorbing. For" 2[0,1],letx 
" ="minA+
(1 ")a and x+
" = "maxA +(1 ")a. In order to show the linear absorption of a, it
is sufﬁcient to prove that there exists ¯ " > 0 such that the smallest perfect foresight path
from x 
¯ " ,  , and the largest perfect foresight path from x+
¯ " , +, satisfy BRi( )(t) =
BRi(+)(t) = fa
ig for all i 2 I and t  0. Then, for any perfect foresight path  from
B"(a), which satisﬁes   ­ ­+ by Lemma 3.3, we have BRi()(t)=fa
ig for all i 2 I
and t 0, so that  converges linearly to a.
Takeanysequencef"kg1
k=0 suchthat"0 >"1 >>0andlimk!1"k =0,andletk, 
and k,+ be the smallest perfect foresight path fromx 
"k and the largest perfect foresight
path from x+
"k, respectively. Here, we assume that "0 is small enough so that both 0, 
and 0,+ converge to a. We show only that for some k, minBRi(k, )(t)  a
i for all
i 2 I and all t  0; a dual argument shows that for some k0, maxBRi(k0,+)(t)  a
i for
all i 2 I and all t  0. Then, setting ¯ " = minf"k,"k0g completes the proof. Note that
0,  ­ 1,  ­  ­ ¯  and that fk, g1
k=0 converges, as k ! 1, to some perfect foresight
path from a, which must be ¯  by Lemma A.1.
Seeking a contradiction, suppose that for each k, there exists T k such that
minBR˜ (k, )(T k) < a
i for some ˜  2 I, where ˜  can be taken independently of k due
to the ﬁniteness of I. Since a is absorbing (and a strict Nash equilibrium), there exists
¯ T such that minBR˜ (0, )(t) = a
˜  for all t  ¯ T. Since 0,  ­ k,  (­ ¯ 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for all k, minBR˜ (k, )(t) = a
˜  for all t  ¯ T. Therefore, it must be true that T k < ¯ T for
all k, so that there exists a convergent subsequence of fT kg1
k=0 with some limit T . By
the lower semi-continuity of minBR˜ , we have minBR˜ ( ¯ )(T ) < a
˜ , which contradicts
(A.1). 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Suppose that a is an MP-maximizer with a monotone potential function v. Let A0
i Ai
denote a set of actions for player i that contains a
i. This set is taken to be A 
i =fh 2Ai j
h  a
ig or A+
i = fh 2 Ai j h  a
ig. For the potential game G0
v = (I,(A0
i)i2I,(v)i2I) with
the unique potential maximizer a 2A0, consider the following optimal control problem







e tv((t))dt subject to  20
z, (A.2)
where 0
z is the set of feasible paths deﬁned on
Q
i (A0
i) with the initial state z. The
state z is taken as minA =(0,...,0) or maxA =(n1,...,nN).




optimal solution to the optimal control problem (A.2) converges to a.
Proof. Apply Lemma 1 in Hofbauer and Sorger (1999) and Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 in
Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) to the restricted potential gameG0
v. 
Lemma A.3. Let X be a nonempty compact set endowed with a preorder ­. Suppose that
for all x 2X, the set Lx =fy 2X jy ­xg is closed. Then X has a minimal element.
Proof. Take any totally ordered subset of X, and denote it by X0. Since fLxgx2X0 con-
sists of nonempty closed subsets of a compact set and has the ﬁnite intersection prop-
erty, L =
T
x2X0 Lx is nonempty. Any element x 2 L is a lower bound of X0 in X. There-
fore, it follows from Zorn’s lemma that X has a minimal element. 
Lemma A.4. For any z 2
Q
i (A0
i) there exist optimal solutions   and + to the optimal











for all i 2 I and almost all t 0.
Proof. Fix z 2
Q
i (A0
i). We show only the existence of  ; the existence of + is
shown similarly. Since the functional J is continuous on 0
z, the set of optimizers is a
nonempty, closed, and hence compact subset of 0
z. Hence a minimal optimal solution
(withrespecttotheorder ­ deﬁnedby(t)­ (t)forallt 0)existsbyLemmaA.3.
Let 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for almost all t  0. Since, by Lemma 2.2, for almost all t  0 there exists i(t) in the






we have i ­ 
i . On the other hand, since i is a best response to  
 i for the gameG0
v






by Lemma 2.2, meaning that the path (i, 
 i) is also optimal. Hence, the minimality of
  implies  






for almost all t 0, as claimed. 
Lemma A.5. There exists ¯  > 0 such that the following holds for all  2 (0, ¯ ): there exists





i (t) a.e.,  
i (0)=minAi





i (t) a.e., +
i (0)=maxAi
for all i 2 I and limt!1+(t)=a.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas A.2 and A.4. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose that v is a monotone potential function for a. Take
  and + as in Lemma A.5. In what follows, we ﬁx a sufﬁciently small  > 0 so that
both   and + converge to a.
Now ﬁx any x 2
Q
i (Ai). Note that   ­ + and  (0) ­ x ­ +(0). Consider the
best response correspondence G for the stage game G. Let ˜ x = f 2 x j   ­  ­
+g. We show, as in the proof of Lemma 3.2, that ˜ G() = G()\ ˜ x is nonempty for
any  2 ˜ x. Then, since ˜ x is convex and compact, it follows from Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem that there exists a ﬁxed point  2 ˜ G()  ˜ x, which is a perfect foresight
path in G and satisﬁes   ­  ­ +. Since both   and + converge to a,  also
converges to a.
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where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the assumption that v is a monotone potential,
































































˙  (t)2 ˜ F()(t)  (t),  (0)=x
has a solution   as in Remark 2.1. Since ˜ Fi()(t)  Fi()(t), we have   2 G(). By
the construction of  , +, and  , we have   ­   ­ +. Thus, we have   2 ˜ G() =
G()\ ˜ x, implying the nonemptiness of ˜ G(). 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Suppose that a is a strict MP-maximizer with a strict monotone potential function v.
For a nonempty set of actions A0
i  Ai that contains a
i, consider the potential game
G0
v =(I,(A0
i)i2I,(v)i2I).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Monotone methods for equilibrium selection 187
Lemma A.6 (Hofbauer and Sorger 2002). Suppose that G0
v is a potential game with a
unique potential maximizer a 2A0. Then, a is absorbing for all  >0.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Suppose that v is a strict monotone potential function with
the strict MP-maximizer a, and let A 
i = fh 2 Ai j h  a
ig and A+
i = fh 2 Ai j
h a











Choose a small " > 0 so that any perfect foresight path for G 
v from x 
" and for G+
v
from x+
" converges to a. Fix any state x 2
Q




and let  be any perfect foresight path from x in the original gameG.
In the following, we ﬁnd perfect foresight paths   and + for G 
v and G+
v , respec-
tively, such that  (0)=x 
" , +(0)=x+
" , and   ­ ­+. Then, since a is absorbing
both in G 
v and in G+
v ,   and + converge to a, and thus  also converges to a.
In the case where G is supermodular, this implies that a is linearly absorbing in G by
Proposition 3.3. In the case where Gv is supermodular, a is linearly absorbing in G 
v
and inG+
v , by Proposition 3.3, so that   and + linearly converge to a, and therefore,
 alsoconvergeslinearlytoa, implyingthelinearabsorptionofa inG. Weshowonly
the existence of  ; the existence of + is proved similarly.
Let ˜ x 
" = f 2 x 
" j  ­  and (t)2
Q
i (A 
i ) for all t 0g. Consider the best
response correspondence G 
v for the stage game G 
v . We show that ˜ G 
v () = G 
v ()\
˜ x 
" is nonempty for any  2 ˜ x 
" . Then, since ˜ x 
" is convex and compact, it follows
from Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem that there exists a ﬁxed point   2 ˜ G 
v ( )  ˜ x 
" ,
as desired.
Take any  2 ˜ x 









tial and the second inequality follows from the supermodularity of ui and Lemma 3.1.









second inequality follows from the assumption that v is a strict monotone potential.
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so that there exists h 2BRi
v(jA 




Then, there exists a best response   to  in the game G 
v such that  (0) = x 
" and   ­
, which can be constructed as in the proof of Proposition 3.1. 
A.4 Proofs for Section 4.3
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let v be given as in the lemma. We show only the conditions (4.1)
and (4.3) for A 
i ; (4.2) and (4.4) are proved similarly. Fix any i 2 I and i 2(A i). If a
i =








is either minAi or a














it follows from a
i =minbri
v(ijA 
i ) that i(a
 i)>pi.
Therefore, if a is a p-dominant equilibrium, then a
i 2 bri
ui(ijA 












Proof of Lemma 4.2. (i) Suppose that a is an LP-maximizer with a local potential
function v. We show that if G or Gv has diminishing marginal returns, then a is an
MP-maximizer with this function v. Fix any i 2 I and i 2 (A i). We show that
maxbri
v(ijA 
i )  maxbri
ui(ijA 
i ). Let ai = maxbri
v(ijA 
i ). It is sufﬁcient to consider
the case where ai >minAi.












for all h <ai. On the other hand, we have
v(ai,i) v(ai  1,i)0
by the deﬁnition of ai.
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for any h <ai. Hence, we have
ui(ai,i) ui(h,i)0
for all h <ai, which implies that ai maxbri
ui(ijA 
i ).










for any h <ai. Hence, we have
ui(ai,i) ui(h,i)0
for all h <ai, which implies that ai maxbri
ui(ijA 
i ).
(ii) Suppose that a is a strict LP-maximizer with a strict local potential function
v. We show that if G or Gv has diminishing marginal returns, then a is a strict MP-
maximizer with the same function v. Fix any i 2 I and i 2 (A i). We show that
minbri
v(ijA 
i )  minbrui(ijA 
i ). Let ai = minbri
v(ijA 
i ). It is sufﬁcient to consider
the case where ai >minAi.












for all h <ai. On the other hand, we have
v(ai,i) v(ai  1,i)>0
by the deﬁnition of ai.







for any h <ai. Hence we have
ui(ai,i) ui(h,i)>0
for all h <ai, which implies that ai minbri
ui(ijA 
i ).190 Oyama, Takahashi, and Hofbauer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)










for any h <ai. Hence we have
ui(ai,i) ui(h,i)>0
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